[OPINION] India: Armenia’s newfound ally against Azerbaijan

EXTRAORDINARY foreign policy ambitions are difficult for small states to achieve, especially when they challenge more powerful neighbors. States with strong determination to pursue these ambitions often seek the support of larger powers, through various means, including military and political alliances.

Armenia, the South Caucasian republic with less than three million population and a size of approximately 29,000 km², is a bright example to illustrate this situation. Although Armenia is a small former Soviet state with limited military and economic capabilities, its constitution contains territorial claims against the country’s more powerful neighbors, Azerbaijan and Türkiye. In the early 1990s, the country dared to occupy 20 percent of the territories of the neighboring Azerbaijan, although the latter’s population was three times as that of Armenia. This was possible thanks to the support of Russia whose leaders instrumentalized Armenia in order to maintain influence over the South Caucasus following the break-up of the Soviet Union.

The current landscape in the South Caucasus has changed significantly. Azerbaijan has liberated its occupied territories and restored full sovereignty within its internationally recognized borders through the 44-day War in 2020 and anti-terror measures against Armenian separatists in 2023. Armenia’s relations with Russia have cooled, although it remains aligned with Moscow through military and economic alliances. However, one constant over the past three decades is Armenia’s continued reliance on foreign powers to pursue its broader ambitions, particularly against Azerbaijan. Today Armenia has expanded the geography of its patrons and enjoys support from France and India via various means and in different spheres. In this context, the India-Armenia allied relations and the former’s military supplies to Armenia create a particular case worth closer scrutiny, as these relations pose a critical threat to the peace and security in the South Caucasus.

India’s expanding relations with Armenia

While India is far from being a regional power, its engagement with Armenia marks a deliberate step in securing a foothold in the ongoing geopolitical restructuring in the South Caucasus. Prior to this shift, relations were primarily focused on identifying areas of mutual interest for future development, limited to regional trade strategy, with Armenia’s potential role in extending the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) through Iran being a key point of consideration. However, the first-ever visit of the Indian Foreign Minister to Armenia in October 2021 revealed the growing strategic dimension of this outreach. The relationship between Armenia and India has notably intensified on multiple fronts, with the defense partnership emerging as the cornerstone of this evolving strategic alignment.

What stands out about this shift in India’s interest in the South Caucasus is its timing as India boosted its engagement with the region particularly following the 44-Day War during which Azerbaijan enjoyed political support of Türkiye and Pakistan. Amidst this backdrop, India has stepped up its defence cooperation with Armenia, raising the possibility of it gradually replacing Russia and becoming Armenia’s security guarantor in this void. Indeed, since 2020, Armenia has purchased advanced Indian-made military systems, making it India’s largest arms purchaser in the fiscal year 2024-2025 entails contracts worth $600 million.

Notable agreements include Armenia’s acquisition of Pinaka multiple-barrel rocket systems, anti-tank missiles, rockets, and reportedly the Akash-1S surface-to-air missile systems with deliveries expected by the end of 2024. In 2023, India also exported the Zen Anti-Drone System (ZADS) to Armenia. Earlier, Armenia received Swathi weapon-locating radars from India in 2020, marking New Delhi’s first major international sale of this type. In a mutual effort to solidify their defense ties, Armenia appointed a defense attaché in 2023, followed by India in 2024. During their first military consultation in May 2024, the two nations agreed to deepen military diplomacy beyond defense trade, encompassing military education, tactical training, and experience sharing. Reportedly, India is now planning to supply Armenia with Pralay short-range ballistic missiles, which have a range of 150 to 500 kilometres and can carry various types of warheads.

Common characteristics of dominant political ideologies of India and Armenia

In addition to the strategic depth that India is pursuing, the ideological affinity between the two nations adds another layer to the relationship, making Armenia appear as a natural partner to India. India’s Prime Minister Modi, who is currently in his third term, has been promoting a Hindutva agenda, advocating for a Hindu renaissance, and envisioning a homogeneous Hindu society for India.

India, home to the world’s largest Muslim minority, has become increasingly dangerous for religious minorities, particularly at the hands of Hindu extremism. Rising anti-Muslim ( as well as against other religious minorities) sentiments have fueled communal riots, exacerbated by institutionalized mechanisms that marginalize the Muslim population. Despite these growing tensions, the government has yet to declare a clear policy or strategy for managing communal relations. Many of these incidents are fueled by radical Hindu rhetoric and hate speech, often coming from members of the ruling BJP party. Yet the declining human rights and political freedom records in India have not hindered its expanding relations with the West, which continues to hold India up as a ‘democratic ally.’

A similar emphasis on ethno-nationalism can be found in Armenia’s core political ideology, which centers on the idea of national homogeneity and aspires to unite the Armenian people within their so-called historical homeland. This ‘Tseghakron’ movement, launched by Nazi-collaborator Garegin Nzhdeh, rooted in racist ideology, promotes a belief in the superiority of the Aryan race. Armenia’s current demographic composition, which is overwhelmingly Armenian, speaks for itself in reflecting this nationalist ethos. The deportation of hundreds of thousands of Azerbaijanis from the territories of Armenia throughout the 20th century and the consistent refusal of the Armenian governments to allow the return of these Azerbaijanis to their homeland is an outcome of these racist ideologies deeply entrenched in the political thinking of the country.

Nonetheless, neither these facts nor a series of rallies and demonstrations, calling for “Armenia without Turks” strangely did attract the attention of Western media. Instead, Armenia has enjoyed unwarranted sympathy, with Western mentality often embracing the country as a victim or, perhaps strategically, as a new address for color revolutions. Readily acceptance of sticky narratives leads to neglect of conducting a reality check on the local discourse in Armenia. For instance, little attention is given to understanding the underlying reasons behind the voluntary departure of Karabakh Armenians, including their voiced reluctance to live alongside Azerbaijanis under the jurisdiction of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

Indeed, Western powers’ courting of both India and Armenia further aligns their political outlooks. For Armenia, this is primarily channeled through pro-Western pivot and aspirations to join the EU. India, meanwhile, enjoys a unique NATO-like partner status, labeled as a “like-minded” state despite significant divergences. Washington has been giving the green light to India’s access to cutting-edge technologies, including membership in the semiconductor alliance, underscoring the deepening defense and strategic ties between them.

Equally important, in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war, is the way Western relations with India and Armenia serve as a test, given that both are defense partners of Russia. Normally, this should have presented a significant challenge; however, there are no indications that it truly is. Instead, strategic circles in the West have shifted toward a more tolerant perspective, contemplating a reasoned approach to both by offering alternatives to help them divert from Russia. On the other hand, this situation raises questions about their roles in evading sanctions while seemingly doing so with impunity in the eyes of the West.

Indeed, it might seem paradoxical that the Russia-Ukraine conflict has provided momentum for India to deepen its relations with Europe, even while maintaining good ties with Moscow. This approach is

evident also in Armenia’s case, which exemplifies a complex duality. The significant increase in its exports to Russia can primarily be attributed to the re-export of products sourced from third countries, facilitating the circumvention of sanctions imposed on Russia. The Western media turns a blind eye to the skyrocketing growth in Armenia’s trade turnover with Russia that jumped from a mere $2 billion level prior to the Ukraine war to the projected $16 billion this year. It is a commonly accepted fact that such a growth would not have been possible without circumvention of the Western sanctions and re-exporting of the sanctioned products.

That being said, this exceptional treatment reveals how both India and Armenia are leveraged in different geopolitical contexts yet are treated by a similar mindset by the political West.

Implications for peace and security in the South Caucasus

The implications of Armenia’s defense procurement extend beyond bilateral relations, influencing regional security dynamics. This complicates New Delhi’s professed neutrality in the South Caucasus. By aligning with Armenia and providing military support at such a critical juncture, India joins a league of countries pushing arms race forward like France in bolstering Yerevan’s revanchism. Such moves have sparked sharp condemnation from Azerbaijan, which views these actions as detrimental to regional peace. Baku has expressed clear concerns, suggesting that external military support is encouraging revanchist sentiments in Armenia, further complicating prospects for lasting stability.

Interestingly, even at its outset, New Delhi poised itself to strategically extend its regional partnerships by coupling Armenia with other key allies through trilateral and multi-frameworks, such as the India-Armenia-Greece and India-Armenia-Cyprus alliances or France-Armenia-India on the horizon. Perhaps the boldest expression of this potential lies in defence alliance between India, Iran, and Armenia. Thus, from an Indian perspective, Yerevan serves as a flexible strategic asset, allowing India to forge various alliances across the region. This flexibility enables India to expand its geopolitical influence, particularly in key alignments such as the India-Iran-Armenia axis, where Iran offers port access for shipments, or the India-Armenia-Greece partnership, which focuses on countering Turkish influence.

Despite India’s framing of the emerging defense partnership as a business endeavor and emphasizing its relations with both countries, the one-sided nature of these dealings undermines the efforts for peace and stability in the South Caucasus by fueling revanchism in Armenia and sparking an arms race in the region.

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* Dr. Vasif Huseynov is a department director at the Center of Analysis of International Relations (AIR Center) and adjunct faculty member at the Khazar University and ADA University in Baku, Azerbaijan.

** The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position of Astro AWANI.

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